(***** Now published in Indian Defence Review and can be accessed HERE *****)
When I explained in my Agni-V article in Indian Defence Review (Please see Agni-V : A True Game Changer article) that Agni V gives India second strike capability , I meant second strike counter force capability it is a way to destroy enemy missile launchers in hardened sheltered strategic command and control systems in hardened underground with Target Strength of above 300 pounds per square inch of pressure, on second strike even with one single MIRVed Agni V at 5000 km range.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal – The Babur-Nasr are Quick First Use, Not
Second Strike
The report
of a successful test of a submarine launched cruise missile, Babur III, by
Pakistan claims achievement of second
strike capability by Pakistan. It is unambiguously clear that Pakistan’s
nuclear capability, missile forces, and even conventional army have been
focused, developed and designed against India. As is well-established Indian
Nuclear Doctrine has the most stringent basis of No First Use (NFU). Since
India will not be conducting first nuclear strike as per its vowed doctrine and
ground evidence, what is the rationale of Pakistan describing this SLCM test as
“achieving a credible second strike capability”?
Indian Nuclear Doctrine and need for a credible second strike capabilityWhen I explained in my Agni-V article in Indian Defence Review (Please see Agni-V : A True Game Changer article) that Agni V gives India second strike capability , I meant second strike counter force capability it is a way to destroy enemy missile launchers in hardened sheltered strategic command and control systems in hardened underground with Target Strength of above 300 pounds per square inch of pressure, on second strike even with one single MIRVed Agni V at 5000 km range.
For Indian Nuclear Doctrine with deep roots in
No-First-Use and creating a credible nuclear deterrence with massive
retaliation on first strike on India, it is imperative that India should
develop a counter value second strike capability. The counter value second
strike implies an ability of some nuclear forces to survive the first nuclear
strike on India, which may be decapitating first strike by say Pakistan and
launch sufficient nuclear warheads to demolish major cities of the potential
opponents. Given the consistent, complete and comprehensive posture that India
has taken since 1974 PNE, Indian Nuclear Doctrine is clear case of an
unambiguous anti-nuclear stance of India as a model nation of the world. A
nation that taken almost a quarter century (1998) to carry out further nuclear
tests when it became clear that Pakistan has the nuclear bomb – acquired under
Nelson eyes of superpowers of the time. Since we have three key attributes of
Indian Nuclear Doctrine – NFU, Credible Minimum Deterrence and Massive
Retaliation on receiving a nuclear attack, it is but obvious that India need to
develop credible, visible and viable capabilities to be able to accredit the
nuclear doctrine. In this regard, India need to have second strike counter
value capability.
Further, since India must create a massive
retaliation capability in second strike – it is imperative that we should
develop not only the second-strike counter value but also the second-strike counter force capability.
Our uniquely articulated doctrine requires massive retaliation that should
decapitate the capability of the attacker to launch any further nuclear attacks
on us. Agni-V with MIRV capability as well as SLBMs provide that capability.
Pakistan Nuclear Doctrine – Quick First Use and Strike below Indian
Threshold
Pakistan has been developing a dangerous doctrine
after Kargil loss. In 1999, in what can be the only direct war between two
nuclear armed adversaries, Pakistan miscalculated the value of its overt
nuclear status and carried out the Kargil adventure. Since then, there have
been umpteen attacks below the conventional levels. On the nuclear end of the
spectrum Pakistan has been developing diverse and deeper nuclear capabilities
that can only be termed usable and all
of them are first strike capabilities.
NASR, Babur, Cold Start Doctrine and Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)
NASR – the 60 KM range nuclear
capable NASR test fired by Pakistan, couple of years back was a very specific
response to India's so called "Cold Start Doctrine" ostensibly
conceived in 2004 to send 8 Independent Battle Groups (each an armored division
equivalent) into Pakistan at high speed and quickly. Pakistan has been giving
this excuse - the CSD excuse - to develop tactical nukes and delivery mechanism
like NASR.
Mutually Assured Destruction is a
cold war term - Nuke deterrence term indicating the balancing of each side
against nuclear strikes by the other side. However, NASR, cannot be construed
as MAD. In NASR’s case, the spiral of increasing deterrence may lead to
increasing probability of an actual nuke use - and looking at current state of
Pakistan - the danger has increased manifolds - as non-state actors may get NASR
and arm and launch it. You never know what Hafiz Saeed types can do with what
they can get their hands to. In fact, with each such increase the possibility
of such nukes falling in the hands of terrorists is increasing considerably
(please see my
article here)
With NASR Pakistan gave us a key
message – “You keep on spending on conventional weapons and bleed your economy.
We will sandwich your conventional capability which is not agile and anyway
cannot create a tempo quick enough for any real gains - we will sandwich you in
the Nukes dimensions with full spectrum capability and keep on poking you in
lower end with variety of mechanisms - Kargil, Parliament attack, 26/11, beheading
your soldiers and many more to come.” NASR is a first strike capability and by
keeping it as tactical nuclear weapon, Pakistan brings it to forward edge of first use.
Babur III -SLCM will NOT be
counter force second-strike although it does increase the counter value second
strike ability, as it is submarine launched. But the warhead that it carries is
sufficient for a Nagasaki/Hiroshima type of nuclear bomb on a city. It cannot
destroy the hardened, underground missile launchers or mobile launchers.
Quick First Use is the nuclear doctrine of Pakistan in contrast to
India’s NFU. Therefore, a second-strike capability has no logic and doesn’t
make sense. NASR and all HATF versions including the Babur III are not second
strike but a potential third strike capability.
The escalatory ladder that
Pakistan envisage, as discernible by their key nuclear capabilities developed
and being deployed, is – (a) Pakistan’s asymmetric/hybrid/multi-domain attacks
leads to India launching a Conventional attack – on a variant of Cold
Start (b) Pakistan thwarted 2-3 of 8
Integrated battle groups that were rapidly approaching deep in Pakistan with
NASR – sub-KT nukes (c) India retaliates massively to completely decimate
Pakistan (d) Pakistan uses SLCM to destroy couple of Indian Cities – say, key
cities in West and South of India with SLCM – Babur III.
These stages of escalation make
the SLCM a third strike capability and not the second strike. As the second strike,
will be by India under massive retaliation as defined by our Nuclear Doctrine.
Key Points
Pakistan has been consistently
developing a full-spectrum first-strike nuclear capability including the
tactical nuclear weapons such as NASR and now the submarine launched cruise
missile Babur III. In contrast to
India’s No First Use (NFU) nuclear doctrine, Pakistan’s nuclear posture and
capability can only be termed as Quick First Use (QFU) – a trigger happy
posture, capability and intent, that is not only dangerous for the
sub-continent but potentially disastrous for the world at large. Positioning
SLCM Babur III as credible second strike capability is a misnomer, as second
strike in the nuclear exchange will be by India – and it will be massive. As
best, if Pakistan survives Indian second strike, Babur may be a third strike
counter value capability that may destroy an Indian city, after Pakistan has
been eliminated from the world.
