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My Book on Strategic Decision Making

My Book on Strategic Decision Making
Applying the Analytic Hierarchy Process
Showing posts with label Risk. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Risk. Show all posts

Thursday, June 16, 2016

Measuring Risk - Pakistani Nukes Escaping to "Funny Fellows"

UPDATE : Now the Indian Defence Review has published a version of this post as well. You can read it HERE




Measuring Risk - Pakistani Nukes Escaping to “Funny Fellows”

Late Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam, India’s ex-President had a mild phrase for the illogical, fanatic, fringe groups including terrorists. He would address them the “funny fellows” – a term that was the most intense rebuke one of our greatest scientists could draft in his soft spoken manner – but it was always an intense rebuke. I am reminded of the phrase “Funny Fellow” as I sift through the details of disgusting Orlando killing in USA.

The horrific Orlando killing has brought the need for tighter gun control law in USA to the fore. The easy availability of assault rifles and automatic weapons definitely increases the probability of random, indiscriminate and unprovoked shootings and the impact of such shootings on the families of unfortunates who lost their lives or were injured is extreme to put it mildly. The measure of Risk is typically defined in terms of probability of an event occurring and the impact/consequences of the occurrence of the event. It is usually a multiplication of these two quantities, hence, Probability x Impact is the basic measure of Risk. To understand the Risks, let us say if Omar Mateen, the Orlando killer, had access to a nuclear weapon, would he have unleashed it on the gay club members, in the hatred of rage that he was feeling or was indoctrinated with? Of course, this is an implausible thought. But let us replace Omar Mateen by ISIS, or any of half-dozen or so terrorist organizations actively propagating heinous acts of senseless killing of innocent people. What is the risk? A terrorist organization having access to nuclear weapons is the type of horrible dreams that may keep security agencies of the world awake all night. One can argue from where these groups will get the technology and the functioning weapon for a nuclear explosion. North Korea can sell for money. However, the obvious source of such a weapon in the hands of terrorists – specifically Islamic terrorists – will indeed be Pakistan.

Pakistani Nukes – A potential source for Islamic terrorists

SIPRI in its latest report on worldwide nuclear weapons estimates Pakistani nuclear weapons to be in the range of 110-130. In 1998 after the Pakistani nuclear tests in response to Indian tests the estimates were that Pakistan may possess and have the fissile material for about 20 Nuclear warheads with a potential yield of 20-30 Kilo Tons of TNT equivalent (usually called 20KT-30KT).  It was assumed that 20-30 nuclear weapons will be sufficient for Pakistan. However, the numbers have gone up 4 times and there is no indication of stopping the maddening spiral of this race. The relentless illogical increase in number of nuclear bombs with Pakistan is becoming riskier with each new nuclear weapon.

A nation state (the Government and the people of the state) has all the right to possess nuclear weapons till the world is not freed of the nuclear weapons - is the key logic that most countries propagated - who were striving to have the ultimate weapon of deterrence. Even today many countries may like to possess nuclear weapons based on the same logic. The non-proliferation logic of Nuclear weapons being horrible in being a danger to humanity as a whole, hence must not be available to every nation state, especially the irresponsible and rouge states, also is valid as it increases the risk of a nuclear incidence. 

The debate of nuclear proliferation in the world continues – however one danger and the risk of nuclear weapons falling in the hands of terrorists, non-state actors and fringe groups – the “funny fellows”, is not only real it is increasing with every new nuclear weapon being developed.  The probability of a nuclear weapon falling in the hands of terrorists – the “funny fellows” is real. However, what is this probability and how one can estimate it, is not very clear.    

Probability of Nukes in Terrorists hands – A Simple Model

Let us assume that the probability (it is always a number between 0 and 1) of each nuke independently escaping to the "funny fellows" is 0.01% and is a constant; let us call it “p”. If Pakistan has 2 nukes the probability that “at least” one of the 2 nukes escape or fall in the hands of “funny fellows” is computed using the following simple calculation. The probability that first nuke does not escape is 1-p, i.e., 99.99%. The probability that second nuke does not escape is also 1-p.  The probability - that neither the first nuke nor the second nuke escapes to the funny fellows - is just the product of two probabilities i.e., (1-p) x (1-p). This comes out to be 99.98%.We are however interested in the probability the at least one nuke escapes to funny fellows. That probability (let us call it E) is E = 1 – (1-p) (1-p). This number for 2 nukes each with p = 0.01% comes out to be (1-99.98%) = 0.02%. 

For 20 Nukes (the year 1998 estimate of potential numbers with Pakistan) the Probability that "at least" one nuke escapes (let us call it E) to the “funny fellows” is simply E= 1- (1-p)^20 is 0.2%. For 110 Nukes this probability jumps to 1.094% and for 130 Nukes it is 1.292 %.  For 150 nukes with Pakistan this probability is 1.489%. Is it fairly acceptable? Can the world live with this probability of at least one nuke escaping to the “funny fellows”.

However, if we double p from 0.01% to 0.02% the value of E changes for 20 Nukes to 0.399%, for 110 Nukes E comes out to be 2.176% and for 130 Nukes it is 2.567%. For 150 Nukes it is 2.956%. We are still less than 5% probability. May be the world can live with that danger. 

If we increase the value of the constant p from 0.01% to say 0.1%, the value of E for 20 Nukes, 110 Nukes, 130 Nukes and 150 Nukes are 1.981%, 10.442%, 12.196%, and 13.936% respectively.  Suddenly it looks more and more risky. In fact, the grave danger is visible in these simple calculations. 

The chart below provides the variation in these probabilities for Nukes 20 to 150 for probability p ranging from 0.01% to 0.1%. The Y axis plots the value of E, i.e., the probability that at least one nuke will escape or reach the terrorists versus the X-axis with the number of nuclear weapons with Pakistan. Different curves are for various values of p, the probability of a nuclear weapon escaping to the hands of terrorists.





If we increase p to 0.2% then we get for 20, 110,130 and 150 number of nukes with Pakistan, the E (i.e., the probability that at least one nuke escaping to Funny fellows) to be 2.925%, 19.766%, 22.915% and 25.946% respectively. 

The numbers for increasing p to 1% becomes extremely difficult to digest the value of E becomes 18.209% for 20 nukes, 66.897% for 110 nukes (lower estimate by SIPRI), 72.925% for 130 nukes (higher estimate by SIPRI) and 77.855% for 150 Nukes with Pakistan. The graph below shows the shift for increasing the value of p to 0.2% and 1%.



 
Increasing Risk

With the probabilities computed above one can see how much has RISK increased from 20 Nukes estimate in 1998 to 130 Nukes in 2016. RISK has a measure typically defined as R = Probability x Impact. If one keeps the impact of a nuclear weapon getting into the hands of terrorist groups as constant, the risk since 1998 (when the estimate of Pakistani nukes was about 20) has increased by 3.5 times in 2016 when Pakistan has about 110-130 Nukes as the probability of at least 1 nuclear bomb reaching the terrorists has increased from around 18% to about 70%. 

Conclusions and Future

One main lesson, if it has to be reiterated again and again, of Orlando killings is that the terrorists indoctrinated to the core by religious fundamentalism and fanaticism, if have easy access to the gravest weapons and means of destruction that mankind has invented, will not be averse to using them against all those deemed enemies or perceived not from faith. Kalam’s “Funny fellows” indeed are becoming not so funny now. With the easy availability of nuclear weapons, just like the easy availability of automatic weapons, these terrorist groups may not be averse to using them anywhere in the world. Since a nuclear weapon has long term impact and a “big” impact, it will be used in a spectacular way. 

The number of nuclear weapons increasing in the vicinity and with the religious supporters of these groups – on both counts Pakistan qualifies - is a sure indication of increasing Risk of a nuclear incidence. Pakistan’s relentless pursuit of increasing the number of nuclear weapons from 20 to 110 has already increased the probability of at least one nuclear bomb escaping to terrorists beyond acceptable limits. The world needs to pressurize Pakistan to not only increase the security of its nuclear weapons but also to cut-back on the numbers which have gone way beyond any reasonable assessment of deterrence logic. In the tunnel vision of this relentless maddening increase of its nukes in perhaps one of the most terrorist infested region of the world, not only Pakistan, but the world is itself calling for its demise. And the cost of an Omar Mateer with a Pakistani nuke will be much more than a debate about gun-control laws.  

Wednesday, March 09, 2016

Threat Modeling and Assessment for Low Intensity Conflict



A war, statistically speaking, is a rare event. It is also an exceedingly costly and disruptive form of interaction between people and states. A war indicates that level of bilateral relationship between two states, which exists from the time first mobilization of troops, is called for against the other side till peace is reached. This view of war implying only active armed conflict however is a restrictive definition. Here it is assumed that war/conflict is in operation, from the moment a state decides upon a policy of armed resistance or inclination to counter an external/ internal threat with military ramifications, to the time the solution of the active threat is achieved or it is made dormant.  Modern day wars have been defined at three levels of increasing intensity though not necessarily increasing complexity and duration (See Fig. 1). At the first level is the most prevalent form of warfare, i.e., Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). The LIC is defined as a conflict between irregular forces, mercenaries, revolutionaries, terrorists, etc., and the regular, conventional armed forces of a nation. The biggest challenge facing the conventionally armed forces of a nation, which are trained and equipped for fighting against the conventionally armed forces of the enemy, is to deal with LIC. The Mid Intensity Conflict (MIC) is the conventional warfare that is indoctrinated in the regular armed forces of the world. With the advent of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), the chances of High Intensity Conflict (HIC), which is defined as a conflict involving WMDs, are increasing. As is evident from Fig 1 the probability of occurrence of a LIC is high and also the duration of such conflicts is more. This is due to the fact that LIC is a continuous process, which the armed forces all over the world have found hard to contain. The probability of WMD based HIC is low compared to LIC/MIC. However, a threat which this spectrum misses out is the possibility that, WMDs may fall in the hands of irregulars engaged in an LIC. This will bring the conflict to HIC levels, where the nation fighting the insurgents or irregulars will suffer. Therefore, the armed forces of a modern nation need equipment, force structure and doctrine to deal with threats at all three levels of intensity. Threat assessment is a major pre-requisite in all three conflict levels.



Sunday, February 02, 2014

Track Chair - International Symposium on Analytic Hierarchy Process, Washington, US, June-July 2014

As Track Chair on Disaster Management and Risk Analysis at The International Symposium on Analytic Hierarchy Process - 2014, I have been soliciting abstracts of papers for AHP/ANP applications on disaster management and risk analysis.
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As Track chair, I have received abstracts under various themes as below. For each session (each composed of a maximum 4 papers) I still have some slots under each session. Organizers have extended the date of final submission so we can accommodate more papers. (each paper should be an application, extension or development of AHP/ANP technique for disaster and risk!

The following is the tentative list - please send your abstract to navneet.bhushan@crafitti.com to be included under these tracks.

(a) Session: RISK AND CRISIS OF INCREASINGLY NETWORKED/COMPLEX WORLD

Paper 1: Social Media Risk Management Strategy : Applying Analytical Hierarchy Process
Paper 2: An integrated approach for management of global risks
Paper 3:
Paper 4:

(b) EXPLAINING, UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONDING TO BUSINESS/INDUSTRIAL
RISKS, CRISIS AND DISASTERS

Paper 5: Improved Project Risk Management using historical risk information and AHP
Paper 6: AHP AS TOOL FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE R&D SECTOR
Paper 7:
Paper 8:

(c) MILITARY, SECURITY AND WAR - RISKS, CRISIS AND DISASTERS

Paper 9: A METHOD OF RISK ANALYSIS AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT USING ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS: AN APPLICATION TO AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM
Paper 10: Crisis Mitigation in Strategic Planning using AHP
Paper 11: Nuclear Scenario in South Asia
Paper 12:

(d) TECHNOLOGY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION - RISKS, CRISIS
AND DISASTERS

Paper 13: RISK ASSESSMENT IN DEVELOPMENT OF LEAN ARCHITECTURE FOR CONTROL SYSTEM OF AN AERO ENGINE
Paper 14: RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT DURING DEVELOPMENT OF GAS TURBINE ENGINE SUB-SYSTEMS
Paper 15:
Paper 16:

Monday, June 09, 2008

SURVIVORS DONOT MATTER

How often I have heard this

"I am a survivor in this organization. I has survived many changes (obviously meaning political)."

I believe, I seriously do believe this


SURVIVORS DO NOT MATTER, Even to the organization/environment in which they are surviving. It is the people who dare to embrace non-survival who impact the organization and the environment.

EMBRACE "NON-SURVIVAL"
Survivors do not matter
Either You die or you change the way organization/environment work -

Once you embrace Non-survival there is NO RISK!

My Book @Goodread